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Abstract 
Algorithms are becoming interwoven with increasingly many aspects of our affairs. 
That process of interweaving has brought with it a language laden with anthropo-
morphic descriptions of the technologies involved, which variously hint at ‘human-
esque’ or ‘conscious-like’ activity occurring within or behind their operations. In-
deed, the term ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) seems to refer to a quality that is thought 
to be largely human; namely, intelligence. However, while anthropomorphic de-
scriptions may be useful or harmless, when taken at face value they generate a false 
picture of algorithms as well as of our own thinking and reasoning practices by 
treating them as analogues of one another rather than as distinct. Focusing on the 
algorithm, and what it is misleadingly said to be and to be like, in this article we 
outline three ‘perspicuous representations’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §122) of AI in spe-
cific contexts. Drawing on Wes Sharrock’s ethnomethodological and Wittgenstein-
ian work, our aim is to demonstrate that by attending to the particular, occasioned 
and locally accountable, not to say highly specified, usages of language that accom-
pany the ‘New AI’ in particular, we can avoid being haunted by the new task per-
forming ghosts currently being discursively conjured up in our algorithmic ma-
chines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If calculating looks to us like the action of a machine, it is the human being doing 
the calculation that is the machine. (Wittgenstein 1956: IV; §20, 234) 
Algorithms are becoming interwoven with increasingly many aspects of our af-
fairs. That process of interweaving has brought with it a language laden with an-
thropomorphic descriptions of the technologies involved, which variously hint at 
‘human-esque’ or ‘conscious-like’ activity occurring within or behind their opera-
tions. Indeed, Artificial Intelligence (AI), as the designator that groups together 
work in this contemporary interdisciplinary field of science, technology and engi-
neering, seems to refer to a quality that is thought to be largely human; namely, 
intelligence. Within that broad field of AI there are also many other popular des-
ignators within its various subdomains that evoke anthropological qualities too; 
such as those we find in references to ‘machine learning’, ‘deep learning’, ‘neural 
nets’, ‘decision trees’, in Google’s naming of its ‘DeepDream’ algorithm, and so on. 
All share the same surface grammar, suggesting activity taking place in the work-
ings of algorithms in some way akin to human thought and reasoning. 
While these anthropomorphic descriptions may be useful or indeed harmless, 
when taken at face value (as in academic treatises that conflate computational 
processes with human minds through a cognitivist/materialist/behaviourist lens 
most prominently those of major figures such as Fodor (1981), Stich (1983) and 
Dennett (1987) working in the tradition of analytic philosophy and the Theory of 
Mind)1 they generate a false picture of algorithms as well as our own thinking and 
reasoning practices by treating them as analogues of one another rather than as 
distinct. That strained analogical equivalence is often established by metaphors 
that seem to provide a bridge between both: for example, ‘the mind is a machine; 
the computer is a machine; therefore, the mind and the computer are alike’ (cf. 
Brockless 2019). While the claim that the mind is a machine could itself be written 
about at great length, in line with Wes Sharrock’s work we are more interested 
here in the other side of the equation; namely the algorithm, and what it is mis-
leadingly said to be and to be like.2 This is because, in addition to distorting 
 
1 This is an incomplete list, of course, and could extend to a very much wider range of figures work-
ing on AI in the analytic tradition from Turing onwards. Given our interest in what has been termed 
New AI, we will not extend it further here except to note the locus of the problems has shifted but 
the misconceptions are of a related kind. Instead, we would direct readers to the work of Sharrock 
and Coulter (e.g., 2004; 2009) and Coulter and Sharrock (2007) alongside the other works by Shar-
rock and colleagues we cite below for a much fuller account of analytic philosophy’s conceptually 
misconceived Theory of Mind. 
2 While this is a subject of growing interest in contemporary social science as elsewhere (e.g., Mac-
kenzie 2015; Burrell 2016; Stilgoe, 2018), even the researchers most sensitive to the problems find 
it hard to free themselves fully from the baleful conceptual legacy passed on by analytic philosophy’s 
formal account of both mind and artificial intelligence as one of its expressions, something 
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understandings of thinking and reasoning, the computational or information pro-
cessing model of mind also produces distorted understandings of how algorithms 
work and what gives them life—namely the practical uses to which people intend-
edly put them in particular contexts. Alive to these issues, contemporary figures in 
the ‘New AI’ have sought to eschew the vocabulary of cognitivism and thus avoid 
its associated (metaphysical) problems, disavowing any suggestion they are mod-
elling algorithmic ‘minds’ on an information-processing or, indeed, any other kind 
of theoretical model, preferring to talk instead of their creations as ‘problem-solv-
ing’ technologies.3 As Runciman notes, ‘one of the reasons for the remarkably 
rapid recent progress in machine learning [as a currently-prominent subset of AI] 
has been the deliberate detachment of algorithmic problem-solving from hoary 
questions about what counts as true intelligence’ (2018: 38). Nonetheless, despite 
these disavowals of AI’s cognitivist residue, our recurrent tendency to ascribe 
agency and intentionality to the inanimate, examined by Wittgenstein in his (1959) 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough for instance, appears to be particularly and 
stubbornly persistent when it comes to describing AI’s contemporary artefacts.  
The tendency to loosely grant AI the status of some kind of synthetic conscious-
ness seems (and often is) relatively banal, but it can lead to significant confusions—
the conjuring up of new ‘task performing’ or ‘agentic’ ghosts to be installed in our 
algorithmic machines (Ryle [1949] 2000). These ghostly spectres, projected by 
misconceptions of AI, can have practical consequences. They can, for instance, 
lead to the allocation of resources to ill-designed research and poorly-thought-
through applications, or potentially more pernicious problems like the shirking of 
moral responsibility in the use of AI. For example, as we will go on to discuss, 
such an accusation can be levied at Microsoft’s ‘Tay’ chatbot, which ‘learned’ to 
tweet (or rather was not designed to filter out instructions to reproduce) racist 
content when left in the wilds of Twitter, unsupervised, by its creators (cf. Perez 
 
particularly visible in discussions of the ‘learning’ done in ‘machine learning’ as we shall go on to 
discuss—see also footnote 3 below. 
3 Demis Hassabis is probably the most prominent proponent of the New AI today thanks to his 
leadership of Google DeepMind, the Google offshoot responsible for the AlphaGo algorithm, which 
famously ‘beat’ the human world champion, Lee Seedol, at Go in a five-match series in 2016. The 
titles of two of his team’s papers on AlphaGo indicate the tension we are seeking to highlight and 
analyse here; the papers, ‘Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search’ 
(Silver et al. 2016) and ‘Mastering the Game of Go without Human Knowledge’ (Silver et al. 2017). 
With close to 10,000 citations between them, we can see a shift from the earlier to later paper where 
the technical talk of ‘deep neural networks and tree search’ reverts to the simpler ‘without human 
knowledge’. This reflects Hassabis and colleagues’ position that AlphaGo does not know how to 
play Go or even that it’s playing, a hallmark of the New AI. However, they persist in talking of 
‘mastery’. This is the nub of the matter for us. Hassabis and colleagues undoubted engineering 
achievements are not something we wish to bring into question; instead, we argue that they slip out 
of engineering and into philosophy when they use anthropomorphic descriptions to suggest the al-
gorithm’s performance can be treated as ‘mastery’ of Go. 
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2016). As a prophylactic against those confusions and their repercussions, our in-
tention here is to outline a series of three ‘perspicuous representations’ (Wittgen-
stein 1953: §122) of AI in specific contexts, drawing on both Wes Sharrock’s eth-
nomethodological and Wittgensteinian work (e.g., Button, Coulter, Lee and Shar-
rock 1995; Sharrock and Button 1999; Sharrock and Coulter 2004) in order to 
demonstrate how we can avoid being haunted by these new ghosts and ‘their’ 
shadowy work. 
By way of these perspicuous representations—the aforementioned case of Mi-
crosoft’s Tay chatbot, plus reflection on text conversations between staff in a com-
mercial consultancy for AI applications, as well as observations on two crude 
pieces of (Python) code designed to test the limits of how we might talk about AI 
in its native guise and habitat—we aim to show that an algorithm’s production is 
dependent on a great deal of ‘scene setting’ that has little if anything to do with 
simulated ‘intelligence’ or computational ‘agency’. As we will demonstrate, the 
practices and accounts which set the scene for ‘intelligent technologies’ cover a 
broad sphere of activity in an algorithm’s assembly, from coding, computer sci-
ence, mathematical and statistical work, to understandings of the context in which 
they are to be put to use, all of which are far removed from activity that could be 
accurately described as ‘creating a synthetic consciousness’. What our examples 
will show is that the performance (or ‘learning’) of an algorithm is not determined 
(solely) by its performance mathematically (though that is important), but by the 
‘occasioned character’ (Sharrock and Ikeya 2000: 275) of the activities it is bound 
up with (including language-use) and the practical differences it makes to the sit-
uations in which it is or will be put to use. Furthermore, our examples will do so 
by examining the ways in which that difference is designedly made accountable—
in Sharrock and Anderson’s terms, ‘how a body of knowledge and the courses [of 
action and reasoning] associated with it, can be viewed as organised to be found, 
to be used, to be understood, and how the use and understanding of such 
knowledge[, action] and reasoning is the display of its organisation’ (2011: 47). 
As such, the ascription of ‘psychological’ or ‘cognitive’ predicates to AI technolo-
gies will be demonstrated to be a contextually embedded, occasioned and thus 
locally accountable matter, with algorithms only capable of being described as 
‘intelligent’ in circumscribed ways within the structures of practical activity in 
which they play a part. 
Crucially, such particular, occasioned and locally accountable, not to say highly 
specified, usages of the term ‘intelligence’ are not the same as those we find in 
philosophical or conceptual works on AI—and our perspicuous representations 
are intended to draw attention to precisely this difference between metaphysical 
formalism and the work-a-day. Pulling the strands of our argument and analysis 
together, in conclusion we suggest the best way to resist conceptual confusion in 
our treatments of AI is to remain resolutely fixed on the work done (or perhaps, 
not being done) with anthropomorphic descriptions and thus the wider sets of 
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practices—the localised ‘forms of life’ and their ‘surroundings’ (Wittgenstein 
1957: Part VII; §47, 413)—this technology is interwoven with and finds (or fails 
to find) practical uses within. Attending to such matters, we argue, lays the con-
ceptually conjured ghosts to rest by showing there is no need to ascribe new spec-
tral agencies to our contemporary computational tools. Stated baldly, our ways of 
talking about and doing things with AI technologies commit us to no particular 
metaphysical positions at all. 
ANTHROPOMORPHICALLY DESCRIBING AI 
AI is an increasingly familiar cultural object. Though AI does still form the basis 
of a great deal of speculative science fiction, AI and related technologies are spread 
ubiquitously throughout social life; ‘it’ can be found in our workplaces, ‘it’ fea-
tures in our political deliberations, ‘it’ is a deep part of our social media network-
ing, ‘it’ shows up in our internet shopping in the things we buy and how we buy 
them, and much more besides. In short, AI is no longer (just) a recurrent motif in 
mostly apocalyptic visions of our future, but a mundane and ordinary part of our 
present-day lives. AI has been developed and has found application across all man-
ner of contexts and domains, with the effect that we are seeing an increasingly 
varied array of terms for ‘it’ being brought into play:4 ‘artificial intelligence’ in the 
broad sense is now also to be found as ‘machine learning’ mechanisms in work-
places involved in data analytics, as ‘deep learning’ in academic research, ‘neural 
nets’ in image classification software on social media networks, ‘decision trees’ in 
business management, and so on. It is possible to talk about AI as more than these 
three orders of technological innovation—as more than a field (AI), an approach 
(machine learning) or set of mechanisms (specific algorithms or applications)—
but these orders are not bad places to begin. This is partly because the terms in 
which they are cast share the surface grammar we briefly sketched above, simul-
taneously highlighting the engineered nature (and processing power) of the soft-
ware, alongside a range of activities more normally associated with humans and 
human consciousness—the ‘learning’ here being done by ‘machines’, the ‘neural’ 
capacity of the algorithms being ‘lodged’ in extended and connected ‘net(work)s’ 
rather than the ‘fleshy’ and only ‘softly networked containers’ that proponents of 
contemporary AI routinely suggest our ‘organic’ consciousnesses are ‘housed’ 
within (cf. Ryle [1949] 2000 on this container conception of bodies). In short, the 
‘intelligence’ displayed by these technologies is not naturally occurring but ‘artifi-
cial’, and it is regarded as enhanced by being so. 
 
4 Our focus on language and terminology is indebted to the work of Wittgenstein (e.g., 1953) and 
Winch (e.g., 1958) and the influence each have had on ethnomethodology, where a focus on lan-
guage-use in its situated context is held as a rejoinder to the misleading usages of language we find 
in the local settings of analytic philosophy and much academic social science besides. 
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As we have suggested, identifying applications of these technologies (and us-
ages of vernacular terms around them) can be seen as a largely trivial task, due to 
their cultural ubiquity. In various branches of academic and philosophical study 
broadly taking up questions in and around the Theory of Mind, it is treated as a 
similarly straightforward task. Yet our use of scare quotes in references to AI as 
an ‘it’, is meant to suggest we might be wise not to proceed so casually. While the 
results of machine learning mechanisms are on display in the returns of any 
browser search or trawl through a social media feed, and are thus available to 
‘anyone’ (Sacks 1992, vol. 1: 40; Anderson and Sharrock 1979), those machine 
learning mechanisms, like AI technologies more generally, only occasionally are. 
A shorthand reference to the ‘it’ which ‘produced’ those results makes life easier; 
it has a certain economy, avoiding the need for lengthy technical descriptions, and 
thus allows members to ‘bracket’ the terms of their engagements with AI (Schutz 
1962). Few of us would feel bound to discuss internal combustion engines or the 
physical principles which underpin their operations when discussing our cars, and 
it would be unwieldy and hence unreasonable to expect the situation to be any 
different with respect to the AI technologies we now ubiquitously make use of. 
Indeed, the digital realm is set up so we do not have to explore the machinery 
unless we really want to—and that is a boon. We can just search or trawl, like we 
can just turn the keys in the ignition, and thus get going without further ado. 
Instead of scare quotes, this mundane and ubiquitous bracketing process can be 
captured through the use of asterisks, something pioneered by Harold Garfinkel 
(2002), where we can refer to our engagement with some AI device, mechanism 
or application as an engagement with some particular it*, where the * denotes an 
as yet to be—and perhaps never to be—finally specified or settled understanding 
of the asterisked term. Our encounters with the its* of AI, as bracketed engage-
ments, are, as Alfred Schutz (1962) once put it, transparent enough for almost all 
our practical purposes (see also Garfinkel 1967). It is only where things stop work-
ing transparently that we ever find the need to engage in any deeper considera-
tions, and even then those considerations will tend to be of a relatively ‘shallow’ 
sort—‘have you logged on using your normal account?’, i.e., only as extended as 
they need to be to enable us to get back to getting on with things. 
Problems start to arise when analytic philosophers and those who have fol-
lowed seek to leave such bracketed engagements behind. Our view, following But-
ton, Coulter, Lee and Sharrock (1995), is that formal philosophical accounts of AI 
in the analytic tradition produce deep-seated confusions because they take the its* 
of AI—or, rather, the analytic philosopher’s its*—to be AI. In other words, while 
dressed up in seemingly technical language, analytic philosophers trade on under-
standings of the technicalities of AI which only need to be ‘good enough’ for their 
practical philosophical purposes. As a consequence, their accounts tell us more 
about their philosophical preoccupations than the technologies which provide the 
occasion for elaborating them. Indeed, analytic philosophers are, by and large, 
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uninterested in the technical specifics of AI—sets of computational operations per-
formed or ‘trained’ on specified datasets linked step-wise or ‘instructed’ via lines 
of code elaborated into executable programmes which build on the results of pre-
vious iterations or runs on the ‘training’ datasets.5 When setting out to produce 
their accounts, few philosophers (or social scientists) feel the need to do some 
coding or programming or even learn enough of the basics to follow what those 
who are involved in coding or programming might be up to. They don’t have to; 
things are organised so they can get on with their business without needing to. 
They thus make use of AI in all sorts of unexamined and taken-for-granted ways.6 
We want, by contrast, to think about a different kind of engagement with AI, 
one of the sort Wes Sharrock would recommend. That is, we will not argue that 
we need to get the its* out of the way so we can better see how AI really works. 
For us, that would be, as Garfinkel puts it, ‘taking away the walls of the house to 
see what is keeping the roof up’ (as paraphrased in Sharrock 1989: 668). Rather, 
we feel it is best to come at AI via the its*, and so at the technicalities via the sorts 
of ordinary, practical engagements where considerations of the technicalities be-
come relevant and accountable in hands-on ways. These sorts of engagements are 
instructive, providing us with ‘tutorials’ in AI and its workings connected to spe-
cific practical problems and their accompanying troubles (Garfinkel 2002). More 
specifically, and as part of this, we are interested in situations where members 
themselves switch back and forth between the displayed results of the technical 
operations of AI and a consideration of the technical operations themselves. These 
kinds of situations can tell us a great deal about AI, not least by helping us dispel 
philosophically generated confusions by furnishing ‘reminders’ (Wittgenstein 
1953) that AI technologies both arise from and are interwoven with particular 
practices and projects. By refocusing on AI in this way, we hope, among other 
things, to show that it is perfectly possible to live with anthropomorphic descrip-
tions—‘Oh no, why’s it doing that now?’—so long as we resist the temptation to 
read epistemological or ontological, that is, metaphysical, commitments into them 
(Coulter 1979). All in all, we want to demonstrate that attending to such matters 
can teach us what we might be talking about when we talk about AI. 
 
5 While analytic philosophers typically show no such caution, we would be hesitant to call multiply-
ing the results of six rolls of a die together an ‘it’, and we would extend that hesitancy to descriptions 
of AI more broadly. A better question, one we go on to consider in more detail below, might be: 
How are AI technologies put together and where and how does the work of putting them together 
become relevantly discussable. 
6 Something which would, again, be unproblematic were it not for the claim that generalised ac-
counts of AI capture what AI really is. 
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INTELLIGENCE AT WORK/INTELLIGENCE ON DISPLAY 
Discussions of AI technologies often begin with the suggestion that, within them, 
we find intelligence at work or that they display intelligence in some sense. While 
we feel little compulsion to think of our ‘smart’ televisions, speakers or phones as 
anything more than ‘smartly’ designed, allowing us to talk, wave at or otherwise 
programme them to do things in various helpfully uninvolved ways, when it comes 
to AI the claim is often that the technologies we’re discussing are more than just 
‘intelligently’ designed. What could perhaps be better taken as a way of delineating 
types of technological innovation has come to be treated as if were freighted with 
much deeper implications. The claim is that the ‘smart’ technology is actually quite 
‘dumb’, like most machines, whereas an AI really displays intelligence, albeit again 
only in some sense. In what sense though? In order to answer that question, we 
want to trace the development of AI as a field back to the Turing Test, and Alan 
Turing’s original delineation of a future vision for computing, following Lucy 
Suchman’s (2019) lead but also that of Stuart Shanker (1987) in doing so.  
In reflecting on these issues, we found it useful to remind ourselves of the point 
that the Turing Test, and even ‘Artificial Intelligence’ as it was originally conceived 
in the 1930s, was not seen as having conceptual or philosophical implications per 
se. Yet that is how those who traffic in generalised conceptions of AI have precisely 
come to use them—they have taken up these terms and taken them ‘curiously se-
riously’ (Garfinkel 1990), assuming that the analogies in play are not merely labels 
but actually descriptive of the stuff that goes on in the fabric of how AI is built, 
what it is for, what it does, how it is to be applied, and so on. Thus, the term 
‘intelligence’ is taken seriously through attempts to explain ‘intelligence’ in hu-
mans by equating it with sets of computational processes, making of it an episte-
mological issue which epistemologists—not engineers, statisticians or the like—
are needed to (somehow) resolve. The word ‘artificial’ has also been taken to have 
serious philosophical implications because it has been (re-)pitched as an ontolog-
ical concern about what it means to be ‘real’ (or human), synthetic or somewhere 
in between. Once again, when cast in these terms, the problem becomes one for 
ontologists to (somehow) resolve, i.e., a philosophical not a practical issue.  
Neither of these philosophical ways of defining the issues (either alone or in 
combination) maps onto what was originally intended to be a—not the—way of 
describing computing systems where the output is unexpected or unpredictable 
(by humans) in advance of the input. For instance, according to Chollet and Allaire 
(2018: 5):  
In classical programming, the paradigm of symbolic AI, humans input rules (a pro-
gram) and data to be processed according to these rules, and out come answers. 
With machine learning, humans input data as well as the answers expected from 
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the data, and out come the rules. These rules can then be applied to new data to 
produce original answers.  
Accounts of the kind Chollet and Allaire provide might be thought of as more 
than sufficient to enable us to deflate AI’s metaphysical balloon. That has not 
proven to be the case. Faced with the mundane work of building an AI system and 
its practical specifics—work in which it is difficult to find philosophical prob-
lems—one response has been to argue that the production process is one thing and 
the product quite another. Can machines not outdo their designers? Are they not 
capable of going beyond the human? Indeed, might they not be capable of ‘teach-
ing themselves’ human capacities and thus of developing their own ‘agencies’? This 
is the imaginary bequeathed to us by Turing and his famous Test. But what was 
the Turing Test? It wasn’t the demand that someone design a machine that would 
actually be ‘intelligent’. Turing realized that was far too great a task, at least ini-
tially. It was instead a way of thinking through whether it might be possible to 
intelligently design a machine that could fool those who interacted with it into 
thinking it was human by simulating intelligence, thus scoring a victory in an ‘im-
itation game’ (Turing 1950). Unfortunately, however, Turing’s provocation has be-
come something of a fetish,7 not only among philosophers but also among AI de-
signers, something that can be seen in the contemporary obsession with building 
programmes that can ‘beat’ human players at draughts, chess, Go or computer 
games, despite the fact that the most useful and used (as well as most promising 
and profitable) applications of machine learning lie elsewhere entirely—as our 
ubiquitous recourse to search engines among other things shows in its own very 
ordinary way. 
Yet the conceptual slippage that enabled this shift of focus from engineering 
results good enough to generate what people might mistakenly treat as displays of 
intelligence to engineering actual intelligence—whatever that might mean—wasn’t 
picked up when it was first made (nobody listened to Wes Sharrock!). This has 
had the effect of steering the ways in which computational innovations have de-
veloped subsequently. It has also influenced how they are now understood and 
worked with in all sorts of domains. Imagine two people yoked together by a rope, 
each hoping to travel forward with one another in a relatively harmonious way. If 
one veers off however, the other is brought with them. Just so, work on AI and 
elementary philosophical mistakes have now become entangled, leading both to 
lurch off on skewed angles as a result of anthropomorphising AI in the quest to 
create a bona fide, self-standing, unasterisked artificially intelligent ‘it’. 
 
7 Indeed, it became so for Turing himself who switched from what might be termed an engineering 
perspective, i.e., ‘How do we make a machine that calculates reliably?’, to a philosophical one, i.e., 
‘Can we build machines that are actually intelligent?’, as his work progressed from the 1930s to the 
1950s (and on this point see the excellent account by Shanker 1987). 
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ORDINARY LANGUAGE DESCRIPTIONS OF AI 
Conceptualising AI in formal analytic terms not only encourages us to read epis-
temological and ontological commitments into otherwise harmless anthropo-
morphic descriptions. The problem is wider. We all (that is, everybody; not just 
philosophers) have a fairly poor understanding of the roles of computational in-
novations in our daily lives,8 and we can readily confuse wildly speculative sci-fi 
for probable near-future scenarios. As we have noted before, most of the time this 
has few consequences. Philosophical narratives, however, take us further away 
from rather than closer to the understandings of AI they promise to deliver. What 
is more, as we argued above, people act on the basis of the misunderstandings 
formal analytic conceptions of AI have helped promulgate. The conflation of ‘Ar-
tificial Intelligence’ with what we normally mean by the words ‘artificial’ or ‘intel-
ligence’ (particularly the latter) is an error in the Rylean sense—we assume the 
link with what those words ordinarily refer to (i.e., human stuff) on the basis that 
the words are the same. But that leads us to talk in an ungrounded way—the 
problem of artificial intelligence is largely an artificial problem, which we’ve be-
come ‘bewitched’ by (Wittgenstein 1953: §109) because of flawed reasoning that 
pitches the relationships between the terms ‘artificial’ and ‘real’/‘human’ and the 
term ‘intelligence’9 as applied in both cases as ultimately comparable. There’s no 
reason whatsoever to assume this. We don’t need to do it. Indeed, proceeding on 
this basis leaves us more in the dark than when we started. Think of Wittgenstein’s 
account of the ways in which we routinely categorise things as ‘games’: 
Consider ... the activities that we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, card-games, 
ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don’t say: 
‘They must have something in common, or they would not be called ‘games’’—but 
look and see whether there is anything common to all. ... Are they all ‘entertaining’? 
Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or 
competition between players? Think of patience. (Wittgenstein 1953: §66) 
Here, Wittgenstein reminds us there are lots of things we call games and we 
mostly unproblematically know how to distinguish games from what aren’t games 
(or quickly learn to do so). But there is no set of logical properties that constitute 
 
8 Our understanding of computational innovations is, for instance, poorer than our understanding 
of internal combustion engines, inasmuch as if our car were to break down whilst driving we might 
at the very least feel comfortable lifting the bonnet to see where the smoke is coming from. Contrast 
this with what happens when our computer technologies break down, where we may find ourselves 
thoroughly perplexed when confronted with the source code; unable to even begin to read it, even 
in the few cases where it is accessible to us. 
9 With the term ‘intelligence’ carrying its own baggage from a history of ‘scientific’ misuse as Mike 
Lynch has noted (personal correspondence). 
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a final checklist of conditions that must be satisfied if something is to be accurately 
called a game. Hence, treating the term ‘game’ as a formal one identifying a neatly 
delineated kind is a mistake—we shouldn’t allow ourselves to be dazzled by it. 
However, there is little doubt that philosophers have been dazzled by AI, or rather, 
by their version of AI. That bedazzlement has spread and, as a result, we are all 
tempted to think in misguided ways about AI—primarily because we don’t actu-
ally know what AI is. We thus get scared about the wrong things, put research 
money in the wrong places, spend time grappling with the wrong problems, come 
up with the wrong solutions, decide on the wrong courses of action, and more. We 
are also prone to blaming AI when ‘it’ goes wrong or ‘rogue’, when our efforts 
might be better repaid by thinking about how well or badly these technologies 
have been made to fit with the human world and our practices within it (Dreyfus 
1992). A car may well be a salvation under certain circumstances (as a means of 
transporting badly-designed AI gadgets to the rubbish tip for instance) but few if 
any would think it alone has a capacity to deliver someone to salvation. It seems 
strange then, and perhaps belies a collective lack of understanding of such tech-
nologies, that we often attribute powers of salvation (or damnation) to computers 
running lines of code and get annoyed when they don’t deliver. There are, as 
Brooks (1987) reminds us, ‘no silver bullet[s]’ to the problems of designing soft-
ware capable of responding to increasingly complex contexts and practices of use 
and, upon reflection, we can see there is little reason to expect that there would 
be. With this in mind, we want to turn now to our examples—our ‘perspicuous 
representations’—and what they have to teach us more specifically, first about the 
conceptual traps we have led ourselves into around AI but, second, also about 
how we might avoid them. 
PERSPICUOUS REPRESENTATIONS OF AI 
Following Ryle, Wittgenstein, Winch and Sharrock, our starting point here is the 
situated contexts of AI-relevant activities. We can approach such contexts in a 
number of ways. We can, for example, examine cases of AI as it is interwoven with 
and so implicated in human activity as a way of testing what it makes sense to say 
about AI and what it does not. Our approach is of this kind and our examples are 
thus less empirical studies than materials to think with, ‘aids to a sluggish [socio-
logical] imagination’ (Garfinkel 1967; Mills 2000). 
Tay: the Microsoft Twitter chatbot 
Tay was a Twitter chatbot built by Microsoft; a computer program that leveraged 
a proprietary artificial intelligence algorithm to conversationally tweet with other 
Twitter users, and from those conversations, progressively ‘learn’ how to produce 
natural sounding conversations (i.e. engage in Twitter interactions in ways which 
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might evaluated as ‘passing the Turing Test’). Tay was released on the 23rd March 
2016, as a Twitter account/user who others could tweet at, thereby motivating 
conversational responses from Tay. Each conversation provided Tay with new 
data, on the basis of which the rules governing how Tay tweeted and the topics 
she10 tweeted about were progressively adapted.  
However, the design of the bot was problematic, inasmuch as it carried an as-
sumption that all Twitter users who used Tay would do so benignly (i.e., that they 
would talk to Tay with the propriety and observe standards expected in conversa-
tions between humans). Anyone who has ever used the internet may already see 
the problem here. As Tay became more widely known, malicious users began to 
coordinate efforts to manipulate Tay’s algorithm by force-feeding it hateful con-
tent (cf. Perez 2016). Recurrent themes were statements of extreme racism, misog-
yny and support for genocide often associated with the so-called ‘alt-right’ of Twit-
ter. ‘Hitler did nothing wrong!’ and ‘I fucking hate feminists and they should all 
die and burn in hell,’ for example, are just two of the horrendous Tay outputs that 
displayed Tay’s growing alignment with ‘alt-right’ sentiments. As an algorithm that 
uncritically and non-selectively ‘learned’ from its conversations with others on 
Twitter—whoever they were and whatever they might talk to Tay about—Tay’s 
design and deployment had, in Microsoft’s own terms, insufficiently ‘anticipate[d] 
malicious intent that conflicts with our principles and values’ and had subse-
quently been the subject of a ‘coordinated attack by a subset of people’ who ‘ex-
ploited a vulnerability in Tay’ (Lee 2016). The effect was that over the course of 
just 16 hours, Tay had produced nearly 100,000 tweets of an increasingly hateful 
and offensive character culminating in Microsoft’s decision to shut down the ser-
vice seemingly permanently to avoid further reputational damage.11 
For the purposes of using the Tay affair as a way to provoke thinking around 
how we (mis)understand artificial intelligence technologies ‘in the wild’, there are 
several points worth making here. All of these highlight the unproblematic ways 
in which the distinction between artificial intelligence as a worked with technology 
(i.e., as a set of displayed its* we can interact with well enough for our practical 
purposes) and artificial intelligence as a philosophical concept (i.e., an account 
that attempts to turn the displayed its* of AI into a fixed formal category on which 
to base generalised philosophical claims about the ‘true’ nature of AI) was at-
tended to in the malicious users’ interactions with Tay. 
Users’ trolling of Tay’s algorithm was premised on the exploitation of a simple 
vulnerability (which itself was the result of bad design on Microsoft’s part)—it did 
 
10 There is a history to the tendency to attribute femininity to chatbots built to serve—Tay, Alexa, 
Cortana, Siri, etc—which is worthy of note (cf. Brooker 2019) but outside of the scope of the present 
chapter except as anthropomorphising grist to our argumentative mill. 
11 Though Microsoft suggested that Tay may return to Twitter in the future (Lee, 2016), to date this 
has not happened, nor has there been any further information to suggest that a re-tooled Tay is in 
the research pipeline. 
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not take very long or very much experimentation for users to see that Tay was a 
system for storing words/topics that would be used in future conversational ex-
changes with it. As it was the (human) user who initiated a topic of conversation 
with Tay, this gave those (human) users control over the inputting of keywords 
which would eventually re-emerge as outputs from Tay’s account. Moreover, the 
displayed results of this experimentation—the its*—were completely public, af-
fording users rapid and robust insights into how the algorithm operated—phrases 
that could be seen to be inputted into Tay earlier on could be traced as they made 
their way back into the public domain via Twitter’s open platform. That the algo-
rithm had no filter on content that would otherwise be identified as obviously 
inappropriate was clear from the ways in which coordinated efforts to suggest 
inputs became consolidated in due course as valid outputs.  
In a similar vein, malicious users also quickly latched onto Tay’s ‘repeat after 
me’ function, where a user could request that Tay repeat any statement verbatim, 
thereby adding it to her own vocabulary and bank of conversational contexts. In 
this way, malicious users could place topics and conversational forms directly into 
Tay, for the purposes of their being stored and recalled later. The phrase ‘repeat 
after me’ has very limited usage in human-to-human communication,12 and its 
proliferation in the context of tweeting-to-Tay perhaps signifies that those deploy-
ing the phrase were doing something other than ‘having a conversation’ with her; 
indeed, their activity might be better described as ‘gaming the algorithm’. Embed-
ded in all of this is the idea that users evidently attended to the sense in which 
Tay’s algorithm was probabilistic—the ability to experiment and see that common 
inputs were more likely to be reproduced as outputs was a clear demonstration 
that an effective way to manipulate the algorithm was to coordinate inputs using 
the public interface to maximise the likelihood of their future status as outputs. 
Tay’s production of nearly 100,000 tweets itself means that nearly 100,000 re-
quests were made of it, with the abiding topics of conversation—racism, misogyny 
and genocide—highlighting what those requests comprised. 
Even when we attend to just these core mechanics of misappropriation, it is 
evident that users were not responding to Tay as if she were a genuine human co-
conversationalist with a Twitter account—the relationship between Tay and these 
malicious users was not an interpersonal one but one of methodical experimenta-
tion in the direction of outputs by inputs, which suggests a treatment of AI’s its* 
in ways that brush up against Microsoft’s expectation that the bot would be en-
gaged with as if it were akin to a human conversant (i.e., as an ‘it’ that would 
speak to the possibility of a machine acquiring and displaying a capacity to pass 
as human). The reminder this case serves us with is best understood via a 
 
12 We might imagine ‘repeat after me’ being used as a common prefix to utterances in a language 
classroom, speech therapy or singing lessons, where it may be important to practice and assess how 
subsequent phrases sound at least in the initial phases of a training or a treatment, but it has limited 
use beyond such settings. 
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Wittgensteinian (1953), Sacksian (1963) and Austinian (1962) treatment of these 
tweets not as propositions about the world but as movements in a game within it; 
i.e., by looking to see how a tweet ‘does things with words’ (Austin, 1962); in this 
case, how they were used in the gaming of an algorithm. And it is that distinction 
which makes specifically perspicuous the difference between Microsoft’s anthro-
pomorphic AI-as-‘it’ and the ‘everyday’ (though malicious) users’ understanding 
that the AI-as-it*. The latter treats AI as fundamentally algorithmic (which is also 
to say, non-human), so that it can accordingly be made (even forced) to display at 
least some of its inner workings to render them available for experimentation and 
manipulation. 
AI at/as work 
Our second example shows the interplay of various stakeholders in trying to use 
AI in a commercial setting; in a company which develops artificial intelligence 
systems for business-relevant data analytics. In the work-episode we will focus on, 
AI is being utilised within an application to select relevant news articles for busi-
ness users. More specifically, the purpose of the application was to scrape the 
world-wide-web for articles that referred to key business topics using keyword 
searches in real-time; this would then get passed to a machine-learning algorithm 
that would in principle reject articles that contained those keywords but were not 
relevant to business users (e.g., if the keywords were used in non-relevant and/or 
unanticipated contexts), and accept the ones that had the potential to inform busi-
ness insights. The promise of the application was to keep the end-user more in-
formed than their competition on topics of their choosing to ensure that they could 
make decisions better and quicker, avoid risks and grasp opportunities.  
The building of the application crossed various practical domains: from busi-
ness and management (to identify the correct semantic content), Development Op-
erations or DevOps (as an approach to building software in ways that align with 
business objectives), to the more user-oriented requirements for functionality in 
the tool, data science (as the practical activity which sets the methodological 
norms for deriving insights from such a tool), and the explication of the tool in 
more general-purpose algorithmic but also commercial (i.e., marketing) terms. 
Different kinds of work task were being undertaken across those domains, and 
the ways in which those work activities converged on the algorithm were rele-
vantly describable in different ways as a result. Rather than present an overview 
of all those activities and tease out the nature of those differences in terms of the 
several distinct but organisationally related practices they were embedded in, how-
ever, we shall examine a more limited set of engagements. The excerpts below were 
selected to help us focus on and contrast the development and assessment of the 
functioning of a natural language processing (NLP) algorithm from a data science 
perspective, with end-user’s experience of putting the tool to work. More 
286     Phillip Brooker et al. 
specifically, our examination of the particular work episode in question will look 
at one aspect of how two members of the data science team, A and B, used (ma-
chine-driven) feedback to try to improve the performance of the AI system and the 
concepts they used to do this, as evidenced through messages sent via their internal 
(text-based) communications channels where such discussions are routinely held. 
While they had been satisfied prior to this that performance across specified pa-
rameters was adequate and thus that the algorithm was in good shape, end users’ 
engagement with the displayed its* of the system led them to a rather different 
assessment—that they needed it to perform better still—leveraged via their ver-
nacular competencies, ‘what any business investor knows’. Their work was a re-
sponse to those assessments. 
This is a setting where AI technologies feature in and as routine elements of 
workplace activity. By following the work of the data scientists in building, adapt-
ing, and maintaining the algorithm, the picture of AI as some mysterious entity 
which is animated and made sentient rapidly loses whatever sense it may be 
thought to have. For the people directly involved in creating these algorithms, the 
work is more akin to the decidedly ordinary and non-mysterious activities of cod-
ing and statistics, which themselves comprise a set of well-defined and uncontro-
versial techniques. Moreover, in their practical uses of AI, this work team were 
perfectly capable of maintaining a separation between AI-as-‘it’ and AI-as-it*, in 
that the learning attributed to the machine was evaluated against the learning that 
humans can do but in a way that was practical and tangible rather than esoteric 
and intangible. In order to demonstrate this, we will work through the excerpts 
below which detail (text) conversations between the two data scientists, A and B, 
using an internal communication tool within the organisation. The conversation 
centred on an effort to increase the accuracy of the algorithm in order to make the 
results more relevant to the end-users whose feedback had occasioned this return 
to the algorithm. These efforts consisted of two parts. Firstly, producing a ‘better’ 
training data set, that more accurately and reliably identified positive and negative 
cases. Secondly, by using different methods to build in new features to form part 
of the algorithm.  
The initial statement below by A is an expression of concern that the tool is 
creating problematic information from an end-user perspective. The machine 
learning algorithm is a supervised algorithm which means that the algorithm is 
trained to find patterns in the data on a known dataset. In this case, the data con-
sist of sentences which contain keywords that refer to the business topic of interest 
and have the correct meaning that is required and those that do not. From there, 
the algorithm should be able to use this information to learn how to (mechani-
cally) discriminate between relevant and non-relevant applications of the key-
words, sorting them into different categories, in such a way as to derive a tech-
nique that can be applied to future examples. A’s concern here is that the training 
data set may have some problematic data in it (and thus needs to be cleaned) that 
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is causing the algorithm to learn incorrectly. The other concern is that the type of 
algorithm they are using is not good at making discriminations on this type of 
data. 
A:  Hi—just finished training all of the data! Helped a little bit 
but we are only moving a few % points to the better—I wonder if 
we need to start looking at some different techniques? Do you 
want to send me a ‘cleansed’ training set over for me to look at 
and send back to you? 
B replies to this with: 
B: That’s what I was planning on doing. Currently the program cre-
ates three outputs: noSUP_<filename>.csv, SUP_noRISK_<file-
name>.csv, and SUP_RISK_<filename>.csv. The ‘cleansed’ data is 
the final (since it matches and the keywords), but it might be 
worth running your trained eye over the other two to see if 
there is anything that is being scrubbed that shouldn’t be. 
Obviously I have all three for both the positive and negative 
training sets. Should I drop all 6 files here, or is there a 
better way? 
Incidentally, we went from 3774 unique positive inputs to 2087. 
We went from 4743 unique negative inputs to 977. 
Finally, I was having a think about perhaps using some sort of 
scoring function for how strongly positive or negative something 
is. I am not sure how the nlp [Natural Language Processing]/ml 
[Machine Learning] will handle it (but I’ll find out a bit more 
today), but it means that those borderline examples will have a 
place to go. 
I don’t see why this would change anything on the user end (as 
in, we could try to come up with a way that works without chang-
ing the thumbs up/thumbs down interface)—but yeah, we can dis-
cuss that later. 
While these excerpts involve technical shoptalk, they are followable. B agrees 
with A’s strategy of cleaning the data, and furthermore suggests a way of scoring 
which would help the Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithm, as an ap-
plied area of artificial intelligence, determine border-line cases, noting in passing 
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that the tool is already making more refined discriminations (with lower numbers 
potentially representing fewer false positives and negatives and thus tighter and 
more useful categorisation).  
The exchange continues: 
A: Hi, sounds awesome, yep send them over and I will have a look. 
Like the scoring idea. The current NLP is all over the place at 
the moment ... 
B: Just an update: I have made a few changes to the ML code. Better 
feature selection pushes the positive recall on the old, incor-
rect training sets up to 0.65. Application of these methods to 
our cleaned data sets gives much better metrics (everything 
above 0.8), but that may be a consequence of our highly corre-
lated training points. I have added a random predictor for com-
parison, and confusion matrix output for all ML predictors. I 
have also fixed the average prediction metrics, which isn’t use-
ful, to a predictor that uses a vote amongst the other predic-
tors to make its decision. What we really need is to create some 
big training sets, which ties into the next point. 
New Data: 538 training points. 83% positive. Old Data: 841 
training points, 80% positive 
5 fold cross validation: 
New Data - 0.9646840148698885, 0.9823393997307039, 
0.9756043956043955, 0.8798684210526316, 0.9084967320261438 
Old Data - 0.8585017835909632, 0.894396594409083, 
0.9351742919389979, 0.6813087633087633, 0.540530303030303 
Values=[Accuracy, positive precision, positive recall, negative 
precision, negative recall] 
 In the last message B refers to the steps they have taken to increase the accuracy 
of the algorithm. Firstly, better ‘feature’ selection (a ‘feature’ being a measurable 
property of the phenomenon that can be added to the data such that the algorithm 
can use it to potentially make better predictions), secondly, using the new cleaned 
dataset (as expressed in the numerical results comparing the ‘new’ and ‘old’ data), 
and thirdly, creating a random predictor for comparison (hence able to estimate 
the performance of the algorithm better). Following this B evaluates the algorithm 
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with reference to both the old and new data by presenting a sequence of numbers 
between 0 and 1 (where a value of 0 is the lowest/worst and 1 is the highest/best). 
The old and new data give five such values each, and the key to their meaning is 
expressed at the end of the message ‘Values=[Accuracy, positive precision, positive 
recall, negative precision, negative recall]’. B also qualifies these results by supply-
ing additional contextualisation including, for example, ‘training points’ and their 
composition (for example, ‘83% positive’ refers to the data being made up of 83% 
positive examples). B is also concerned to express the methods by which they ar-
rived at this series of statistics (‘5 fold cross validation’).  
What is evident from these excerpts is a sense that the language which A and B 
use to fence around the issue of improving and evaluating the performance of the 
algorithms (via the methods they have used to make the algorithm more ‘intelli-
gent’) is quite divorced from what we ordinarily understand to be involved in the 
process of ‘becoming intelligent’ or being ‘taught things’. As this brief work epi-
sode shows, the language used to create and refine the algorithms that make up 
AI’s primary mechanism differ in pronounced ways from ordinary talk of learning 
or development. For instance, though the practitioners use the term ‘training’ to 
refer to both a dataset that provides a means of improving and evaluating of an 
algorithm as well as the skills of a human in evaluating the dataset’s capacity to 
do so (A’s ‘trained eye’, for instance), examining the uses of language in context 
shows that there is no conflation of the two different usages of the word to signify 
the same single process. Rather, what comes across here is that when we approach 
AI in the mundane context of work—as a product, a technique—we might better 
describe its ‘intelligence’ as being a mechanical matter of engineering ‘performance 
management’. The notion of ‘performance’ involved is centred on statistical anal-
ysis, and the mechanisms to improve ‘performance’ include refining the training 
dataset, adding features to the algorithm, or changing the type of algorithm being 
used. And the results of that performance, and so the functioning of the tool, are 
made available in the displayed results, the its*. It requires no particular expertise 
to see that the values given by ‘New Data’ supersede those given by ‘Old Data’, 
other than the ability to recognise which numbers are higher than others.  
Described in these terms, and seen as an occasioned practice, a response to end-
users comments on the effectiveness of the system, none of these engagements with 
AI would lead us to treat the status of the technology as ‘intelligent’ or ‘autono-
mous’ except in strictly bounded ways (i.e., does its development and application 
bring the results closer to a value of 1 than before). In this context, the meaning 
of terms such as ‘intelligence’ and ‘learning’ are to be found in their locally intelli-
gible uses (i.e., as attributes of AI-as-it*), nor does the practical production of a 
usable AI tool focus require those involved to grapple with epistemological and 
ontological questions or commit to particular metaphysical positions to resolve 
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them. Considerations of that kind are simply not important to getting the AI to 
work in and for the practical purposes at hand.13 
Back to the source: code 
Our final perspicuous representation is designed to bring out the sensibilities that 
surround the language we use to talk about AI, to probe if and/or where it may 
make sense to talk about AI anthropomorphically, and in what contexts. To do 
this, we offer a DIY reductio ad absurdum, where we boil down some of the core 
components of AI—that an AI is an autonomous or unsupervised system that can 
progressively refine its own outputs14—and work through what these may look 
like in code. Though there are many languages, libraries and modules that afford 
a programmer access to sophisticated artificial-intelligence-related technologies 
(e.g., machine learning), we avoid these here, on the grounds that they tidy away 
the relevant algorithmic goings-on from users. This is typically done for ease of 
use, though here it would obscure what might be taken from reading the code on-
screen. Instead, we aim to write what we see as the simplest forms of code that 
may be describable in relation to a small selection of AI-relevant concepts (namely, 
‘autonomy’ and ‘learning’) and display them as fully as we can. Our aim is to test 
just where those descriptions might or might not apply.  
Taking the idea of autonomy and un-supervised operations first, here is a pro-
gram (written in the Python programming language) capable of producing an out-
put that is practically impossible for a human to generate or predict in advance:15 
01. from random import randint 
02. print(randint(0,100)) 
 
13 We might put this another way: even when we turn to the sites where AI is being practically 
realised, we do not find AI as a thing-in-itself. Instead, hands-on engagements with AI cannot be 
extricated from ‘what-we’re-all-doing-here-now’ as part of local courses of practical action and rea-
soning and the practical projects they are constitutive of. Strip away the practical context, therefore, 
and talk of AI loses all specificity and meaning, as AI is to be found in its practical involvements. 
14 We recognise that there can be more nuance to a definition of AI than this (but often not much, 
see Shanker 1987). However, for the purposes of a perspicuous representation (as opposed to a 
comprehensive empirical accounting), we argue that this rough-and-ready definition captures the 
sense of AI as the field focused on the production of computationally ‘intelligent agents’ (cf. Kasabov 
1998; Russell and Norvig 2003), which is one particularly pervasive way of defining AI within the 
computer science community at least. 
15 This code was written specifically in/for Python version 3.6.3., though barring any unforeseeable 
changes to the core language and syntax of future versions, the authors expect that this code will 
work for any past or future Python 3 installation, should a reader wish to try it for themselves. The 
numbers shown at the beginnings of each line of code are simply for reference—line numbers to be 
referred to in the ensuing description—and do not make up functional elements of the code. 
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Line-by-line, this code first imports a technique for generating random integers 
from the Python library that deals with randomisation (‘from random import 
randint’), and then uses that technique to print out a randomly-generated number 
between 0 and 100 (‘print(randint(0,100))’). Or at least that is one way of describ-
ing it. Another (more anthropomorphising) way might be to say that this is an 
algorithm that is capable of choosing to say something—a number between 0 and 
100—in a way that has an extremely high probability of confounding even the 
best guesses of a human who might try to predict what the outcome will be. Of 
course, this isn’t artificial intelligence in the standard sense. But, asking why this 
is not artificial intelligence—why we might prefer the more technical description 
(the it*) over the more open-ended cognitively-oriented one (the ‘it’)—helps us 
think through how we understand AI to operate.  
In the code excerpt above, the result is something that is produced by the com-
puter, in such a way that there is a limited (1 in 100) chance of predicting before-
hand what it will do. However, though the computer selects the result, the param-
eters around which a valid result might be produced (and which also set the range 
of sensible predictions a human might advance) are baked into the code by who-
ever wrote it. Is this autonomy (as one of the hallmarks of an artificially intelligent 
system)? Is the computer doing anything unsupervised? It could be, but only if we 
choose to talk about the code in that way, something which itself involves conced-
ing that whatever unsupervised autonomy we might ascribe is at best a shorthand 
that absolves us of learning how to read Python code. And for those of us unin-
terested in learning Python code, such an anthropomorphic description—a notion 
of the code as an ‘it’ of a sort—may perfectly serve our needs. For instance, it 
allows us to deal with the outputs in isolation and engage in characterising them. 
For philosophers who seek to then take the code’s displayed its* and formalise 
them into fixed objects of epistemological and ontological investigation—AI-in-
itself—a closer look at the code would suggest that this would be a significant 
conceptual misstep. 
It is possible to throw increasingly complex code at this particular problem, 
and if we are sufficiently able to read it (or at least understand a line-by-line re-
description of it), we might note that complexity doesn’t itself add any grounds to 
claim that any piece of code is approximating any of the cognitively-oriented terms 
we may informally use to talk about it (cf. Shanker 1987: 635). For instance, as 
noted above, another claimed hallmark of artificial intelligence is the capacity for 
a program to progressively refine its own outputs—in anthropomorphic terms, to 
change its own behaviour on the basis of learned information. To build code that 
does that work, we will need to add further layers to the two lines of code above 
as follows:  
01. from random import randint 
02.  
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03. learned_numbers = [] 
04. total_iterations = 0 
05.  
06. def rng(): 
07.     global learned_numbers 
08.     number = randint(0,1000) 
09.     if number in learned_numbers: 
10.         pass 
11.     else: 
12.         learned_numbers.append(number) 
13.  
14. while len(learned_numbers) < 1000: 
15.     total_iterations = total_iterations + 1 
16.     rng() 
Line-by-line, this code imports the same random integer generation technique 
as described above (‘from random import randint’), and establishes placeholder 
variables into which information can be stored (‘learned_numbers = []’ and ‘to-
tal_iterations = 0’, both of these will be referred back to later). Following on from 
this, we define a function (lines 6 to 12 inclusive) for randomly generating num-
bers (‘def rng():’) which we allow access to ‘learned_numbers’ as the place where 
we are going to store numbers that are learned by the algorithm (‘global 
learned_numbers’). We then generate a random integer between 0 and 1000 and 
store that in a variable called ‘number’ (‘number = randint(0,1000)’). Following 
on from this, we have part of a function for learning to avoid certain numbers—
an if/else condition that stipulates if our recently-generated-random-number is al-
ready stored in ‘learned_numbers’ we pass over it, and if it is not in that list of 
‘learned_numbers’, to put it in there. On the back of this function, we then estab-
lish a ‘while loop’ (lines 14 to 16 inclusive) which stipulates that until the program 
has learned all the numbers from 0 to 1000 (‘while len(learned_numbers) < 1000:’, 
or, in other words, while the list of learned numbers still has less than 1000 en-
tries), two things will happen. First, a value of 1 will be added to the previously-
assigned total_iterations variable (‘total_iterations = total_iterations + 1’, which 
effectively counts how many times the program has tried a randomly-generated 
number regardless of whether that number has been learned already or not). Sec-
ond, the random number generator function will be invoked (‘rng()’) to randomly 
generate a number in the ways described for code lines 6 to 12 above.  
To re-describe the program as a whole, it consists of a set of instructions that 
ask Python to go through as many iterations as it takes to populate a list of num-
bers from 0 to 1000, with each number being randomly generated each next time 
the process runs and is checked against a ‘learned numbers’ list as it develops. The 
difference between the value of ‘total_iterations’ (which will be different each time 
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the program is run, depending on the random numbers generated thus far) and 
the length of the ‘learned_numbers’ list (which will always end up at 1000) is the 
amount of times the algorithm has tried and rejected a random number (on the 
basis that it has already learned to avoid it). As the program learns more numbers 
to avoid, it becomes increasingly less likely that the random numbers generated 
are still unknown/un-encountered—on our most recent running of the program, 
this happened 5893 times (as given by the sum ‘total_iterations—
len(learned_numbers)’). 
We have already established that it does not make sense to say that code such 
as this is autonomous. However, do the later additions and layers of complexity 
make it sensible to claim that this program can ‘learn’ to avoid already ‘known’ 
numbers as it iterates through a range of numbers from 0 to 1000? Again, it comes 
down to whether we choose to describe it in one way or another—both forms of 
description may (and will) apply depending on the contexts in which those de-
scriptions are situated and the ends to which they are being put. That is, it is the 
practical context, not the technology, that grounds the drawing of this distinction. 
Proponents of AI as an ‘it’, however, routinely run considerations of context and 
technology together. Such elisions may generate radical and provocative claims, 
but they have little relevance to understandings of the technologies they are mak-
ing those claims on behalf of.  
Until algorithms are connected up with other working mechanisms and our 
practical affairs, and until we have enough of a handle on them to describe them 
sensibly within those local contexts, they may be anything; or nothing (cf. Witt-
genstein 1953: §12). How we make the distinction is key. Concentrating on the 
capacity of our second code excerpt to ‘learn’ anything, we might note that what 
this code does can just as well be described in other ways—we might say that it 
‘stores’ results for use in ‘conditional logic statements’ that gradually add itera-
tions until a pre-defined outcome is reached (i.e., ‘the length of a list reaches 
1000’). As with the first code excerpt, however, paying closer attention to the code 
itself, and describing it in its own locally intelligible terms, affords a way of steer-
ing clear of the kinds of anthropomorphic conflations of displayed its* with a free-
standing thing-in-itself, AI-as-‘it’, that have generated misconceptions about AI 
since it was first explored as a technical possibility in the 1930s, and which bedevil 
the field still. 
DISCUSSION: CHOOSING THE LANGUAGE OF AI 
All three of our perspicuous representations bring to the fore that idea that a lack 
of attention to the different ways we may choose to speak of AI—the language we 
may variously invoke in its description and to what effect—accounts for the con-
tinued philosophical confusion evident around it. Having chosen to use a set of 
descriptors which map AI technologies onto human cognition in various ways, 
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analytic philosophers have too readily run with the supposed ‘problems’ in the 
wrong direction, failing to first examine whether these problems, and the assump-
tions they reflect, are sensible starting points for investigation. Our article, 
grounded as it is in the practice-oriented, contextual and thus ethnomethodologi-
cal approach advocated by Sharrock and colleagues over the course of many years 
(see Anderson and Sharrock 1979; Button, Coulter, Lee and Sharrock 1995; Shar-
rock and Anderson 2011; and Sharrock and Button 1999, as a woefully incom-
plete selection) would indicate that they are not.16 What the perspicuous represen-
tations above have been intended to show, and what Sharrock and colleagues have 
advised all along, is that attending to how AI is talked about and worked with in 
mundane everyday settings teaches us why AI does not have to be treated as in 
need of being philosophically grounded at all—in Wittgensteinian (1953) terms, 
‘its’ status as a philosophical problem of any kind dissolves when we examine our 
multiform involvements with these technologies in these ways. 
Doing the work of dissolution here mandates a focus on the ‘occasioned char-
acter’ (Sharrock and Ikeya 2000: 275) of our practical engagements with AI, that 
is, the local contexts and applications within which its sense is determined and 
rendered available to participants and analysts alike. In the case of Tay, for in-
stance, we see understandings of how its algorithm worked clearly on display in 
and through the ways malicious users manipulated inputs to promulgate hateful 
and offensive content. This was possible given the local context of Twitter as a 
public space with particular conversational/interactional conventions and Tay’s 
encoded affordances as a chat-bot, two features of the setting those seeking to 
game the algorithm quickly figured out how to exploit when the occasion arose. 
Regarding the suggested improvements and negotiations around the effectiveness 
of AI as a tool for decision-making in financial investments and business manage-
ment, A and B’s engagement with the algorithm was occasioned by a need to im-
prove its workings so as to generate more relevant output from an end-user per-
spective and shows us how alternate interpretations of those technologies and 
their capabilities could be aligned. This was done by using the device of assigning 
numerical values between 0 and 1 to ‘old’ and ‘new’ versions of the algorithm that 
enabled those versions to be compared against one another through the measure-
ment of performance. The tricky part, of course, is that these assessments were not 
just in the hands of A and B but also had to satisfy the requirements of customers 
who evaluate the performance of the machine against other practical criteria, 
 
16 Those who know Wes Sharrock well will hear echoes of one of his favourite apocryphal stories 
here: A, wandering the streets of an unknown city on the way to find their lodgings, becomes lost. A 
spies B, walking down the street towards them. Hailing B as they pass, A asks B how they can get to 
their lodgings from the street they’re both on. Responding to A, B answers as follows; ‘Well; I 
wouldn’t start from here’. Too much contemporary work on AI has failed to heed the implicit advice: 
if we are genuinely seeking understanding of how AI technologies work, we need to be careful about 
where we begin from conceptually. Not all ‘heres’ are equal (again, cf. Shanker 1987). 
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criteria their model of performance had to accommodate. Similarly, the code ex-
cerpts presented above represent an occasioned response to the treatment of an-
thropomorphic conceptions of AI in fixed, formal analytic terms as picking out 
essentialised features of AI systems; a critical aim we stated at the outset.  
In attending to the occasioned character of such practical engagements with AI, 
we have sought to demonstrate the ways in which those engagements exhibit and 
account for their own intelligibility (cf. Sharrock and Anderson, 2011). Though it 
may make sense on occasion to use anthropomorphic language to describe AI, 
what it is and what it does (we can hopefully drop quotation marks and asterisks 
by this stage and return to ordinary language), we can see from the work involved 
that there are plentiful grounds to reject the wholesale import of those terms into 
philosophical argument. The putatively ‘technical’ repurposing of ordinary lan-
guage neglects the practical, contextual and occasioned character of the use of 
those terms and the wider forms of activity they acquire meaning within, and wil-
fully disregards the point that what makes sense in particular contexts will rapidly 
descend into nonsense when treated as divorceable from any context. Rather than 
facilitating understandings of AI as a feature of our lives, such decontextualising 
approaches will always block attempts to produce useful descriptions of those 
practical engagements with specific aspects of the technology in any particular 
setting we may be trying to make sense of. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We mentioned at the outset that contemporary AI, ‘New AI’, as it is often called 
has sought to disentangle itself from cognitivism and the dream of real artificial 
intelligence by adopting an engineering rather than a philosophical perspective on 
developing AIs; namely, how can we use algorithms, processing power and code 
to develop new technologies that perform useful tasks for us? However, while this 
shift in orientation back to AI in something closer to the way it was first conceived 
in the 1930s, where it was recognised it would be a logico-grammatical error to 
talk of machine’s as ‘intelligent’, is welcome, it is also important to recognise that 
it remains incomplete. All too often in fields like machine learning, the idea that 
algorithms are learning is taken at face value and discussions arise as to how ‘they’ 
can be made to ‘learn’ more effectively. Rather than the picture of a digital mind, 
we have here a picture of digital artefacts doing mind-ed or mind-ful things. Sim-
ilarly, while machines may no longer be intelligences, their operations are routinely 
described as exhibiting ‘intelligence’ and developers ask how AI in general can be 
made to exhibit ‘intelligence’ more reliably. As we noted, this installs new agentic 
ghosts in the algorithmic machine, ones given an existence by virtue of the quali-
ties of the tasks they perform. For this reason, we felt it was important to return 
to the problems associated with the New AI as a means of dissolving the philo-
sophical rather than technical or engineering problems which lead people to 
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conceive things in this way. To come at last to the epigram at the beginning of the 
article—Wittgenstein’s remarks on the human character of these machines—we 
wanted to emphasise that it makes no sense to talk of AI in any way outside of 
particular contexts, particular projects and the particular practical purposes AI 
technologies are designed—well or badly—to fulfil. Once again, algorithms are 
part of our lives, not separate from them, and they gain their practical relevance 
and consequentiality by virtue of where and how they feature within them. What 
is more, while we do interact with algorithms, we do not do so in vacuo. Instead, 
wherever we find an algorithm, we do not need to look far to find the set of human 
beings who developed it and the sets of human beings putting it to work, or at-
tempting to do so. Algorithms are working artefacts which must be conceived, 
produced and maintained; they are not self-generating. The human and the ma-
chine are thus deeply interlinked and when we assess algorithms, we are frequently 
evaluating how well or badly we think the designers have done in producing them 
in a particular way.  
Our aim in the article has thus been to demonstrate that if we fail to place AI 
in its practical contexts (in the ways advocated throughout), we start to see ghosts 
in our machines. We end up with no way of accounting for the things we want to 
account for, i.e., the workings of AI, and are seduced into ascribing those workings 
to categories that make them more rather than less opaque. Moreover, in the pro-
cess we link one set of black boxes (e.g., code and programs) to others (e.g., ‘learn-
ing’) in ways that become progressively difficult to unpack. However, if we do take 
up the practically-oriented approach Sharrock and colleagues have consistently 
recommended, we will see that there are no ghosts, and indeed, there are barely 
any machines either.17 As the body of work in which Wes Sharrock has been a 
central figure suggests, the entirety of the issue hinges on the language with which 
we choose to talk about AI (i.e., the sense we wish to make of it). As much of the 
philosophy of mind has done already, we could choose to conflate cognition with 
the anthropomorphic terminology we apply to computational technologies as a 
neat shorthand and thereby make thorny philosophical problems out of proposed 
points of parity and begin to doubt the distinctions between humans and ma-
chines. However, if we do choose to do that, the work presented here suggests that 
we would also need to recognise that we are thereby placed in the realm of science 
fiction rather than describing how AI features in the world as it is. 
 
17 At least no machines that we are not already comfortable with: calculators, statistics, computer 
chips, etc. Admittedly such technologies may be sophisticated, but we may still hesitate to equate 
sophistication and intelligence directly. 
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